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PLEA BARGAINING FOR DNA:  IMPLICATIONS ON THE RIGHT 
TO PRIVACY 
Linda Bartusiak* 
They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, 
deserve neither liberty nor safety. 
  —Benjamin Franklin1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
DNA is a very important and useful tool for solving crimes and 
convicting criminals.  DNA technology is evolving rapidly, and scien-
tists are constantly finding new applications for its use by law en-
forcement personnel.  With all these new technologies come new 
threats to privacy.  DNA is obtained by law enforcement from indi-
viduals, but under the Fourth Amendment, individuals have the right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of their person 
absent probable cause.  In some situations law enforcement officers 
clearly have probable cause to seize an individual’s DNA.  In other 
situations, despite having apparent probable cause, an individual’s 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures and a re-
lated reasonable expectation of privacy may rightly prevent police 
from being able to collect or use that person’s DNA. 
In Orange County, California, the District Attorney offers a plea 
bargain to arrestees for misdemeanor crimes only:  in exchange for a 
DNA sample, the District Attorney will drop all charges against the 
arrestee.  Police will then retain that person’s DNA sample in their 
database (“Orange County database”) indefinitely. 
Aside from due process questions about the circumstances sur-
rounding the acquisition of DNA, the use of DNA databases for vari-
ous purposes implicates significant privacy concerns.  The two privacy 
issues of greatest concern are familial searches and function creep.  
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of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for their helpful feedback and editing sugges-
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This comment will discuss these and other privacy risks of DNA data-
bases and evaluate how the Orange County database is designed to 
address these risks.  Specifically, Orange County should set a time 
limit on the inclusion of arrestee profiles in the database to balance 
the needs of law enforcement with an individual’s reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.  Additionally, although Orange County’s prohibi-
tion on familial searches is one very important privacy safeguard, the 
amount of allowed and encouraged function creep remains a serious 
problem and needs to be addressed to ensure the privacy interests of 
the program’s participants are protected. 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF DNA AS A TOOL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Investigators began using DNA analysis to investigate crimes in 
1987.2  By the mid-1990s, the use of DNA to solve crimes had become 
mainstream.3  Any DNA sample stored properly, regardless of age, 
may be able to produce a viable sample for testing.4  The procedure 
for extracting DNA samples that will be included in the federal Na-
tional DNA Index System (NDIS) is heavily regulated by the DNA Ad-
visory Board (DAB), a division of the FBI.5  The DAB is responsible 
for promulgating quality control standards and for doing proficiency 
testing.6  DNA testing is the most regulated forensic science in Ameri-
ca and is considered to be the most scientifically sound.7  State and 
local labs are not required to follow DAB procedures for profiles that 
will not be included in NDIS.  Many such labs, however, either follow 
these procedures or analogous procedures voluntarily.  For example, 
in California, DNA labs that contribute to the state database are re-
quired to be accredited.8 
Scholars and practitioners actively debate how this developing fo-
rensics field should evolve in order to best serve the needs of justice 
and the courts.  One of the major points of dispute is the fact that 
prosecutors have much greater access to DNA evidence than defen-
 
 2 See Norah Rudin & Keith Inman, Forensic Science Timeline, FORENSIC DNA CONSULTING, 
http://www.forensicdna.com/Timeline020702.pdf (last updated Feb. 7, 2002). 
 3 See Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds:  A Genetic Tattle Tale Based on Famili-
al DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 12 (2010). 
 4 Analyzing DNA Evidence, DNA INITIATIVE, http://www.dna.gov/basics/analysis/ (last vi-
sited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 5 See Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science:  The Need to Regulate Crime 
Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 209 (2007). 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 210. 
 8 CAL. PENAL CODE § 297(d) (West 2008) (requiring accreditation “by ASCLD/LAB or any 
certifying body approved by” ASCLD/LAB) (quotations omitted)). 
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dants have.9  One proposed solution is to require all crime labs to op-
erate independently from police and other investigative depart-
ments.10  Another solution is to provide defendants the same access to 
DNA evidence that prosecutors have, particularly for defendants who 
believe they could be exonerated based on DNA testing.11  A second 
major point of dispute involves the treatment of evidence once it is 
admitted in court:  what expert testimony is required or allowed to 
legitimize it before the fact finder?12 
A.  Federal DNA Databases 
The federal government, through the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gations (FBI), collects and stores DNA in the National DNA Index 
System (NDIS).13  This index is a part of the Combined DNA Index 
System (CODIS).14  CODIS is a computer system that collects DNA in-
formation from local, state, and national sources and allows users to 
identify serial crimes, match suspects, and discover other patterns.15  
The FBI restricts CODIS access to public crime labs that have been 
accredited and trained on CODIS procedures and quality standards.16  
There are two main indexes in the CODIS system:  the convicted of-
fender index and the forensic index.17 
 
 9 See Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk:  Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for 
the Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 898–907 (2008) (discussing disparities between de-
fendants and prosecutors in the ability to find and develop forensic evidence). 
 10 Id. at 906–07. 
 11 See id. at 915 (describing the unreliability of eye witness accounts and the ability of DNA 
analysis to exonerate those who have been falsely accused based on mistaken identifica-
tion). 
 12 Compare Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–95 (1993) (listing various 
factors to consider when determining the reliability of expert scientific testimony under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence), with Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 
158 (1999) (holding that all expert testimony, not just testimony based on scientific 
knowledge, must rest on a reliable foundation and be relevant to the task at hand, and re-
liability may be determined at the discretion of the trial judge by considering one or 
more of the factors articulated in Daubert). 
 13 Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), DNA.GOV, http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/codis 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 14 Id. 
 15 What Is CODIS?, DNA.GOV, http://www.dna.gov/solving-crimes/cold-cases/
howdatabasesaid/codis/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 16 FBI—CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-
and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 17 How Does CODIS Work?, DNA.GOV, http://www.dna.gov/solving-crimes/cold-
cases/howdatabasesaid/codis/howcodisworks (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
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Every state collects DNA from convicted offenders and shares the 
information with NDIS.18  As of December 2010, NDIS includes over 
9,233,554 offender profiles and 351,951 forensic profiles.19  Each state 
sets its own qualifying level of crime that will require a DNA sample to 
be sent in for inclusion in the database; each state also has some lee-
way on the type of information it collects for inclusion in the data-
base.20  Since 2006, NDIS accepts DNA profiles from arrestees for cer-
tain offenses where the state requires a DNA sample for that specific 
offense.21  Some states also maintain their own databases of suspect 
DNA samples, but much of this information is ineligible for inclusion 
in the NDIS.22  Federal law places strict limits on the requirements a 
DNA profile must meet before it can be uploaded to NDIS, although 
states are free to maintain their own databases that are subject to dif-
ferent state legislative restrictions.23  The NDIS procedures board sets 
policy, monitors compliance, and ensures quality control at the fed-
eral level.24 
As of December 2010, the CODIS database had provided leads to 
over 129,500 investigations.25  The number of leads is expected to 
grow annually as more DNA profiles are stored in NDIS and the 
technology for improving DNA recovery from forensic evidence de-
velops.  In 2000, Congress passed the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimina-
tion Act,26 which provided funding to local, state, and federal DNA 
crime labs.  One of the Act’s purposes was to accelerate the process of 
testing and indexing backlogged DNA evidence because existing la-
boratories lacked capacity to meet the growing demand for their ser-
vices.27  The Act also gave the United States Attorney General the au-
thority to expand NDIS by requiring collection of a DNA sample 
from all incarcerated individuals, from anyone convicted of a qualify-
ing offense (most felonies), and from anyone currently serving parole 
 
 18 Types of Profiles in the Database, DNA.GOV, http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/types/ (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 19 Codis-—NDIS Statistics, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics/. 
 20 NDIS Procedures and Administration, DNA.GOV, http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/ndis 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 21 Types of Profiles in the Database, supra note 18. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2260 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132–14135 (2004)); see also Levels of the Database, DNA.GOV, 
http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/levels/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (“States may have 
their own regulations regarding which profile types can be maintained at SDIS.”). 
 24 NDIS Procedures and Administration, supra note 20. 
 25 See Codis-—NDIS Statistics, supra note 19. 
 26 Pub. L. No. 106–546, § 2, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14135 et seq.). 
 27 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 14135(a) (2000). 
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for a qualifying offense.28  Finally, the Act set additional procedures 
for the collection of DNA samples, including the delegation of au-
thority to state and local agents, and required that all samples col-
lected under this statute be submitted for inclusion in NDIS.29 
B.  State and Local DNA Databases 
State and local databases maintained independently from CODIS 
are referred to as “rogue” databases.30  These databases are not sub-
ject to the federal laws governing DNA collection; it is up to each 
state legislature to enact its own laws.  While many of these laws re-
semble the federal equivalents, states have greater discretion in de-
termining what DNA samples will be included and what, if any, limits 
will be placed on the use of such samples.  Local databases, like the 
one maintained by Orange County, are not subject to any mandatory 
oversight in California.31 
In 2004, California voters enacted Proposition 69, which ex-
panded the state DNA database.32  This law mandates the collection of 
DNA samples from all convicted state felons, all convicted state sex 
offenders, and from all parolees from state felony or sex offender 
sentences.33  For qualifying offenders, it is a misdemeanor to refuse to 
provide a DNA sample.34  In fact, the law authorizes law enforcement 
personnel to use reasonable force to obtain a sample.35 
Proposition 69 drastically expanded the scope of DNA collection.  
Before Proposition 69, California collected an average of 47,878 DNA 
profiles per year.36  In the first year after Proposition 69, approximate-
ly 600,000 individuals qualified for DNA testing.37  As of September 
 
 28 42 U.S.C.S. § 14135a (a)(1), (2) (2000). 
 29 42 U.S.C.S. § 14135a (a)(4), (b) (2000). 
 30 See Tami Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.?  DNA Sample Could Buy Release, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
2009, at A1 [hereinafter Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.?]. 
 31 See The California Report:  Expanding DNA Databases Raise Questions, KQED Public Radio 
(Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.californiareport.org/archive/R910080850/b (interview with 
Kara Dansky, Executive Director of the Stanford Criminal Justice Center) [hereinafter 
California Report, Dansky interview]. 
 32 See Proposition 69, “DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act of 
2004,” available at http://ag.ca.gov/bfs/pdf/sec_state_full_version_prop69.pdf. (codified 
in scattered sections of the California Penal Code) [hereinafter Proposition 69]. 
 33 See id. 
 34 CAL. PENAL CODE § 298.1(a) (West 2008). 
 35 CAL. PENAL CODE § 298.1(b), (c) (West 2008). 
 36 See Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California’s Proposition 69:  A Dangerous Precedent 
for Criminal DNA Databases, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 199, 211 n.25 (2006). 
 37 See id. at 201. 
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2010, the California database included 1,691,511 profiles.38  These 
profiles have provided leads in 15,094 investigations.39  Five years after 
Proposition 69 was enacted, in January 2009, the law expanded to re-
quire any suspect arrested in California on a state felony charge to 
provide a DNA sample.40  In addition to California, only Virginia, 
Texas, and Louisiana collect DNA from arrestees.  Unlike California, 
these three states all limit collection to those arrested for felonies or a 
few discrete crimes, rather than permitting samples from all arres-
tees.41 
These profiles are maintained even if charges are later dropped or 
if the suspect is found not guilty.42  Approximately 60% of California 
suspects arrested on state felony charges are never convicted.43  Citing 
privacy concerns, particularly for people acquitted and those on pro-
bation or parole, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has 
filed a court challenge to the constitutionality of Proposition 69.44 
III.  DNA AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The intersections between DNA collection and the right to privacy 
are numerous and warrant close examination.  Most privacy concerns 
relate to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
 
 38 See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROPOSITION 69 DNA BANK PROGRAM:  REPORT FOR THIRD 
QUARTER 2010, available at http://ag.ca.gov/bfs/pdf/quarterlyrpt.pdf; see also Codis—
NDIS Statistics, supra note 19 (showing that as of December 2010, California had only 
submitted 1,321,925 offender profiles for inclusion in NDIS). 
 39 See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38. 
 40 See Proposition 69, supra note 32 at 137. 
 41 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 296 (West 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609 (2005); TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 411.1471 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2–310.2:1 (2008); see also Simon-
celli & Steinhardt, supra note 36 at 202 (describing the DNA sampling practices of Virgin-
ia, Texas, and Louisiana). 
 42 See Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Files Challenge to Proposition 69 (Dec. 7, 2004) (on file 
with author), available at http://www.aclu-sc.org/releases/view/100787 (announcing that 
the ACLU has filed a suit against Proposition 69 challenging the law as unconstitutional 
on privacy grounds). 
 43 See Simoncelli & Steinhardt, supra note 36 at 201. 
 44 See Press Release, ACLU, supra note 42.  The case is currently awaiting a decision from the 
Ninth Circuit for the ACLU’s appeal from the denial of their motion for a preliminary in-
junction of the law.  ACLU of Northern California, Haskell v. Brown, ACLU OF NORTHERN 
CALIFORNIA (Jul. 10, 2010), http://www.aclunc.org/cases/active_cases/haskell_v._
brown.shtml (discussing the case and including links to the complaint, ACLU and amicus 
briefs, and a recording of oral argument). 
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or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.45 
“A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”46  By its very nature, DNA 
collection47 and use involves the identification of a suspect without 
any individualized suspicion whatsoever.  DNA collection also impli-
cates the right to privacy for medical records and genetic materials.48  
The maintenance of a DNA database calls both of those rights into 
question.49  Individual privacy rights are extended to protection from 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, for example to be se-
cure in the privacy of one’s body from invasion by the state.50  Cali-
fornia is one of a handful of states that gives its citizens a state consti-
tutional right to privacy.51 
A.  Why DNA Deserves Enhanced Privacy Protections 
While some analogize DNA profiling as just another form of iden-
tification, such as an advanced method of fingerprinting, in fact they 
 
 45 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 46 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 
U.S. 305, 308 (1997)). 
 47 Taking a DNA sample is recognized by courts as a search under the Fourth Amendment.  
See Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2009) (listing Supreme Court 
and Circuit Court decisions supporting this assertion). 
 48 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R. § 162.502, 164.306 
(2009); U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY 
RULE  2–4 (2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/
summary/privacysummary.pdf (describing the privacy protections provided to health in-
formation by HIPAA); see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) 
(“The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diag-
nostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedi-
cal personnel without her consent.”); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (acknowl-
edging “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”). 
 49 See Press Release, ACLU, supra note 42 (“Collecting DNA through Prop. 69 is a direct vi-
olation of a person’s Fourth Amendment and due process and privacy rights.” (quoting 
ACLU Staff Attorney Ricardo Garcia)). 
 50 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (noting that 
while the right to privacy is not absolute, when “certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, 
the Court has held that regulations limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘com-
pelling state interest’” (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 
(1969))). 
 51 See CAL. CONST., art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have in-
alienable rights.  Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and 
privacy.”); see also Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13467 (showing other states that 
expressly provide for a constitutional right to privacy, including Alaska, Arizona, Florida, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington). 
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are very different.  In the forensic context, fingerprints and palm 
prints serve as identification tools only.  While DNA permits identifi-
cation, it also carries information about a person’s race, family histo-
ry, predisposition to various diseases, appearance, and behavioral 
traits,52 as well as their legitimacy of birth.53  Scientists claim that DNA 
may also be able to shed light on a person’s aggression, substance ad-
diction, criminal tendency, and sexual orientation.54  As DNA profil-
ing technology improves, it is possible that scientists will be able to 
mine even greater or more specific information about a person from 
that person’s DNA. 
B.  Legitimate Expectation of Privacy 
For prisoners, there is no legitimate expectation of privacy.55  Due 
to this diminished expectation of privacy among prisoners, courts 
have held there is no Fourth Amendment violation when states re-
quire DNA samples from convicted felons.  The rationale for this 
holding is that the collection is both minimally invasive and is justi-
fied by a legitimate government interest.  Specifically, the govern-
ment has a strong interest in solving crimes, which may be advanced 
by linking currently incarcerated prisoners to unsolved or other 
crimes.56  Additionally, courts have held that no individualized suspi-
cion is required to obtain DNA samples from prisoners.57  In fact, 
federal statute mandates that a DNA sample be collected from every 
person serving qualifying federal sentences.58 
Although qualifying convicts are required to provide a sample of 
their DNA, they have no legal right to access their own DNA sample, 
 
 52 See Simoncelli & Steinhardt, supra note 36, at 208 (noting that DNA profiling may be used 
for identification purposes, but that the “DNA itself represents more than a fingerprint”). 
 53 See DNA Forensics, http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/
forensics.shtml (“DNA profiles are different from fingerprints . . . .  DNA can provide in-
sights into many intimate aspects of people and their families including . . . legitimacy of 
birth . . . .”) (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 54 See Simoncelli & Steinhardt, supra note 36, at 208. 
 55 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525–26 (1984). 
 56 See Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1266 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (noting that building 
a DNA database to gain “accurate identification for purposes of solving past and future 
crimes” satisfies the special needs exception to government searches); see also United 
States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that police already possess so 
much information about defendants by the time they are convicted that the additional in-
trusion obtained through a DNA sample is small in comparison to the legitimate state in-
terest in recording it). 
 57 See Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that, in some cir-
cumstances, the government’s interests outweigh the need for individualized suspicion). 
 58 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a). 
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or to test and compare their DNA to other untested DNA evidence in 
post-conviction proceedings.59  Individual states, however, can grant 
state prisoners this right through legislation.60 
Unlike prisoners, normal citizens have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy,61 so the rationale for collecting DNA from prisoners does not 
apply to citizens.62  Courts apply a totality of the circumstances test in 
determining whether a DNA sample may be obtained from non-
prisoners without violating the Fourth Amendment.63 
The only method by which law enforcement can obtain a normal 
citizen’s DNA without going through the totality of the circumstances 
test is through covert involuntary DNA sampling.  An example of co-
vert involuntary DNA sampling would be when a citizen uses a tissue 
or licks an envelope and the police surreptitiously seize the item.  
Critics of such covert involuntary sampling assert that the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonable expectation of privacy64 protects citizens 
from the threat that the police would employ such tactics to sample 
their genetic material.65  That assertion, however, is in tension with 
the recognition that there is no Fourth Amendment reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy for an abandoned item because that person’s vo-
litional act of relinquishing the item forfeits that person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy with regard to that item.66 
Sampling the DNA of arrested persons prompts additional privacy 
concerns.  Although arrestees have a decreased expectation of priva-
 
 59 Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Circuit v. Osbourne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009) 
(declining to recognize a prisoner’s right to DNA evidence). 
 60 Id. at 2316. 
 61 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (noting that the Fourth Amendment re-
quires that the police respect a citizen’s minimal, reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 62 See Lina Alexandra Hogan, Fourth Amendment—Guilt by Relation:  If Your Brother is Convicted 
of a Crime, You Too May do Time, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 543, 583–84 (2008) (discussing 
court decisions that discussed prisoners’ reduced expectation of privacy in the context of 
familial searches and declaring that those holdings do “not apply to a family member who 
is a free and law-abiding citizen with an undiminished expectation of privacy”). 
 63 See United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[T]he totality of circumstances 
analysis is . . . the appropriate framework to apply” for a search of an individual on condi-
tional release). 
 64 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
 65 See Laura A. Matejik, DNA Sampling:  Privacy and Police Investigation in a Suspect Society, 61 
ARK. L. REV. 53, 56–57 (2008) (noting that, under the Fourth Amendment reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis, there is a “delicate balance” between an individual’s free-
dom and society’s interest in resolving crimes). 
 66 See California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) (holding that that there was no unlaw-
ful seizure where the contents examined had been abandoned); see also Matejik, supra 
note 65, at 72 (“The Fourth Amendment does not protect abandoned items because the 
act of abandonment relinquishes a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in aban-
doned items.”). 
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cy, that status may be temporary, depending on whether the arrestees 
are convicted.  Not all arrestees are convicted:  the charges could be 
dropped, the suspect could be acquitted, or the arrestee could be the 
victim of a case of mistaken identity.  Unfortunately, the DNA data-
bases do not remove the DNA profiles for arrestees who are not later 
convicted. 
The government’s practice of retaining the DNA profiles for ar-
restees could and does perpetuate improper law enforcement prac-
tices and procedures.  The most common example derives from the 
demographics of the DNA collection.  Since a disproportionate num-
ber of minorities are arrested, DNA databases that include arrestee 
data include a disproportionate number of minorities’ DNA.67  It is 
possible that this bias results in some minorities being unfairly 
searched during the daily searches run in these databases, and that 
unfair familial partial matches are being made as well. 
C.  How Law Enforcement Obtains DNA 
Law enforcement may acquire DNA directly or indirectly, or vo-
luntarily or involuntarily, and either with or without the suspect’s 
knowledge.  An example of direct collection of DNA is from the sus-
pect himself; an example of indirect collection of DNA is forensic in-
vestigation of a crime scene.  If a suspect abandoned an item, law en-
forcement may collect the suspect’s DNA “involuntarily,” or without 
that suspect’s knowledge or consent.68  Significant privacy concerns 
are implicated, however, when law enforcement deliberately sends 
items directly to the suspect for the sole purpose of surreptitiously 
collecting the DNA afterwards.69  Law enforcement typically invokes a 
special needs exception to obtain abandoned DNA based on hunches 
 
 67 See Solomon Moore, F.B.I. and States Vastly Expand DNA Databases, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 
2009, at A1 (“[E]xpanding genetic sampling in the United States could exacerbate racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system”); California Report, Dansky interview, supra note 
31. 
 68 For example, if a suspect throws a cigarette butt on the ground or throws away an 
envelope he licked, police can pick it up and send it to a lab for analysis.  See, e.g., State v. 
Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 31–32 (Wash. 2007) (holding that police could obtain a DNA sample 
from an envelope defendant licked and then threw away); United States v. Flynn, 309 
F.3d 736, 737–38 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding a defendant voluntarily abandoned drugs 
when he left them at the top of an exit ramp even though police were pursing him). 
 69 See Matejik, supra note 65, at 55–56 (describing an example where police sent a suspect a 
fake class action notice with the intent that he would lick the envelope and send it back to 
them). 
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and absent a warrant or other judicial oversight.70  This exception is 
broad. 
Another quasi-voluntary method police use is the DNA dragnet.  
Typically, a DNA dragnet is used after police obtain a DNA sample 
from the crime scene but find no matching profile in the existing da-
tabases.71  Based on physical characteristics72 that can be determined 
from analyzing a DNA sample found at the crime scene, police will 
request all persons in a geographic area who meet those physical de-
scriptions to “voluntarily” provide a DNA sample.73  While it is legal to 
refuse to provide a sample, many individuals feel compelled to pro-
vide a sample in order to avoid appearing guilty.  This feeling of 
compulsion is particularly prevalent when the dragnet is based on a 
partial match that suggests a familial connection and there are only a 
handful of possible matches, despite the lack of individualized suspi-
cion for those individuals.74  Of all the states that engage in DNA 
dragnets, only Nebraska has a law regulating this practice.75 
IV.  PRIVACY ISSUES SPECIFIC TO DNA DATABASES 
A.  Time Horizons for Profile Storage 
A significant privacy concern is the duration of time that DNA 
profiles are retained by the government.  The Privacy Act of 1974 has 
ben interpreted to prevent federal law enforcement agencies from 
maintaining dossiers of information on individuals not suspected of 
wrongdoing.76  In contrast, the DNA of convicted criminals can be 
 
 70 The special needs test is typically applied in situations where a warrant would be imprac-
ticable due to the need to act quickly to preserve evidence.  See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (holding teachers do not need to obtain a warrant to search 
students for drugs because swift and certain action is necessary in maintaining school dis-
cipline); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (holding blood alcohol test-
ing does not need a warrant because alcohol dissipates quickly in the blood). 
 71 See generally Sepideh Esmaili, Note, Searching for a Needle in a Haystack:  The Constitutionality 
of Police DNA Dragnets, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 495 (2007) (discussing the constitutionality of 
the use of “DNA Dragnets”). 
 72 Such characteristics include race, gender, familial connections, or appearance. 
 73 See generally Esmaili, supra note 71. 
 74 Gabel, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
 75 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29–4126 (2008).  See Matejik, supra note 65, at 62 (“Nebraska is the only 
state that has enacted a statute addressing the collection of voluntary DNA samples.”). 
 76 See The “Open Government Act”:  Hearing on S. 394 Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech., and 
Homeland Sec. Comm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (statement of 
Lisa Graves, Senior Counsel for Legislative Strategy, American Civil Liberties Union) 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2005/031505graves.pdf; see also Privacy Act 
of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e), (j) (2006) (providing limitations on collecting information).  
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kept in CODIS indefinitely, even after a prison sentence or parole 
term has concluded.77  As a result, these profiles will continue to be 
searched in every crime run through CODIS.  The information can 
also be used indefinitely to make familial matches against those 
whom the government has no individualized suspicion of wrong-
doing. 
While an individual not suspected of wrongdoing may petition to 
remove his DNA from NDIS, the process is legally complex and in-
volves a very onerous standard.78  Further, that person may not peti-
tion for removal until at least two years from the date of arrest.79  Dur-
ing that time, or indefinitely if a person is unable or unwilling to go 
through these burdensome procedures, his DNA will be included in 
all searches run on the database. 
An ordinary citizen with no convictions has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.80  Once this person’s DNA is included in a DNA data-
base, however, it will be subject to all future database searches with-
out individualized suspicion.  Given the onerous standards and 
lengthy period of time required to remove a DNA profile from the 
databases, an argument could be made that the profile will be sub-
jected to an indefinite license for unlimited searches absent new rea-
sonable suspicion.  Where the DNA profile came from an arrestee 
who was never convicted, these searches continue despite the restora-
tion of his reasonable expectation of privacy. 
B.  The Practice of Familial Searching 
The use of DNA profiling raises significant privacy concerns when 
used in familial searching.  Familial searching permits investigators 
who find a partial DNA match to use that person as a “pivot,” or a 
person who is likely related to the true offender.81  Once police iden-
 
 77 See Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that a DNA profile is 
like a snapshot so neither storage nor use of the profile gives rise to independent Fourth 
Amendment claims). 
 78 See CODIS—Expungement Policy, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/
codis_expungement (listing the requisite procedures for the expungement of DNA 
records) (last visited Mar. 27, 2011); see also Simoncelli & Steinhardt, supra note 36, at 
204–05 (noting that an individual who seeks to get their DNA back must send a formal 
request to three different offices). 
 79 Simoncelli & Steinhardt, supra note 36, at 205 (“[A]nyone swept up in a DNA dragnet in 
California should expect that they will not be able to get their DNA back for at least two 
years . . . .”); see CODIS—Expungement Policy, supra note 78. 
 80 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 81 Gabel, supra note 3, at 18. 
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tify a pivot, they can investigate that person’s relatives with greater 
scrutiny, despite the absence of any individualized suspicion. 
Unlike prisoners, normal citizens have a higher reasonable expec-
tation of privacy,82 so the rationale for sampling the DNA of prisoners 
does not apply to citizens.83  The reasonableness test suggests that 
while familial searching may enable law enforcement to identify a 
new suspect, they must still develop an individualized suspicion 
against that new suspect before they can obtain a new DNA sample.84  
In the case of familial searching, an involuntary DNA sample from 
one suspect can be used to cast suspicion on a sibling, cousin, or oth-
er relative against whom police have no other basis for suspicion.85  
This violates the relative’s reasonable expectation of privacy because 
law enforcement is now able to identify him using a criminal DNA da-
tabase, despite the fact that the relative did not choose to voluntarily 
abandon a DNA sample, nor did the government have a legitimate 
reason to obtain one from the relative.86  As a result of the suspected 
criminal behavior of the pivot, the relative can now be tagged from a 
DNA database without any individualized suspicion.  The risk to the 
right to privacy is even greater if the pivot’s DNA was obtained 
through an abandoned sample that police collected without a war-
rant. 
Familial search results, however, sometimes lead to the successful 
apprehension of the perpetrator of a crime.87  That success has led to 
an increase in attempts to collect abandoned DNA, so that police may 
search the database and identify potential relatives of the perpetrator 
without alerting the suspect.88  At this time, no law prevents police 
from obtaining abandoned DNA from a suspect’s family member 
 
 82 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
 83 Hogan, supra note 62, at 553–60 (discussing how a convict’s Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy has been curtailed based on the “special need” of the government to protect the 
broader interests of the public); see also Matejik, supra note 65, at 85 (discussing the dif-
ferences in analyzing privacy claims of private citizens and convicted criminals). 
 84 Hogan, supra note 62, at 559–60 (noting that individualized suspicion is usually required 
to justify a search conducted without a warrant). 
 85 Matejik, supra note 65, at 59–60. 
 86 Id. at 60. 
 87 Gabel, supra note 3, at 26 (“One study estimates that familial searching could give a forty 
percent boost to the number of investigative leads generated from a DNA database 
search.” (citing David Lazer, Searching the Family Tree for Suspects:  Ethical and Implementation 
Issues in the Familial Searching of DNA Databases, TAUBMAN CENTER POLICY BRIEFS, Mar. 
2008, at  1,  available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/
file/pdfs/centers-programs/centers/taubman/policybriefs/lazer_final.pdf)). 
 88 See Maura Dolan & Jason Felch, State Offers Police Extra DNA Tool, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 
2008, at A1 (discussing the controversies surrounding California’s use of familial 
searches). 
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when the police are unable to obtain abandoned DNA from a suspect 
and want to determine if that lead is worth pursuing.  Thus, the po-
lice may investigate a pivot’s relatives absent any individualized suspi-
cion and without a warrant because they are related to, for example, 
a person who was arrested for a misdemeanor and who accepted a 
deal from prosecutors.  Often, the relative is unaware that the pivot 
was arrested because, perhaps, no charges were filed or the state 
agreed to conditionally drop the charges and the pivot went on with 
his life.  The common conception of a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy conflicts with these investigative techniques. 
Another privacy concern implicated by familial searching is the 
confidentiality of a person’s medical records, including his or her ge-
netic relationships.  The results of familial searching could result in 
police revealing genetic relationships to unknown relatives, including 
illegitimate children, half siblings, and other previously secret rela-
tionships.89 
California leads the nation in conducting familial searches and 
has articulated a specific policy to use this investigative tool whenever 
applicable.90  Concerns about familial searching are exacerbated in 
jurisdictions that include arrestee samples in their database.  Unless 
jurisdictions curb their use of this leading-edge investigative tech-
nique, any time the DNA of a person arrested for a misdemeanor but 
never charged is included in a DNA database, it may be used by po-
lice to identify relatives as future suspects. 
C.  The Temptation of Function Creep 
The final major privacy concern for individuals who have had 
their DNA entered into databases results from function creep.91  
Function creep refers to a situation where the use of a database ex-
pands beyond the original contemplated purpose of that database.  
For example, a database originally created to track sex offenders has 
already been expanded to track perpetrators of other qualifying 
crimes, then arrestees and parolees, abandoned samples, and finally, 
to run familial searches.  Future expansion creates additional risk of 
 
 89 Id. 
 90 See Memorandum from Lance Gima, Chief of Bureau of Forensic Services to All Cal. Law 
Enforcement Agencies and Dist. Att’ys Offices, (Apr. 25, 2008) (on file with The University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law); see also Dolan & Felch, supra note 88 (observ-
ing that California is the national leader in familial DNA searching); Gabel, supra note 3, 
at 22 (observing that California is the national leader in familial DNA searching). 
 91 Jeffrey Rosen, Genetic Surveillance for All, SLATE, (Mar. 17, 2009, 4:52 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2213958/pagenum/all/. 
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function creep.  Part of the problem is that individual states are al-
lowed to set their own policies regarding who is included and what 
information is retained in state databases.92  Law enforcement can al-
ready use the information contained in CODIS databases to deter-
mine a person’s ethnicity, appearance, and certain medical condi-
tions. 
Function creep goes beyond the mere inclusion of more types of 
DNA profiles.  When the existing and ever-evolving capabilities of 
DNA testing technology are combined with the government’s ongo-
ing attempts to create databases that follow medical records, credit 
history, travel patterns, document requests, and other activities, the 
threat to traditional concepts of privacy becomes even more real.93  In 
addition to the function creep occurring within government-
maintained DNA databases, the Patriot Act of 2001 permitted the 
government greater access to datasets maintained by private entities.94  
These private databases could allow the government or other parties 
with access to both databases to tie different types of commercial in-
formation to DNA records. 
V.  THE ORANGE COUNTY DNA COLLECTION PROGRAM 
In 2009, the District Attorney of Orange County, California, in-
troduced a program that would allow any person arrested for a mis-
demeanor to voluntarily provide the District Attorney’s office with a 
DNA sample.95  In exchange for the DNA sample, the District Attor-
ney would drop the misdemeanor charge.96  At the time of the ex-
change, the defendant is required to “sign a waiver explaining the 
rights . . . giv[en] up and the fact that [the DNA] will be put in the 
 
 92 Id. 
 93 See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 317, 333–35 (2008) (describing the results of a survey measuring ratings of intru-
siveness of various investigatory actions); see genereally JAY STANLEY, ACLU, THE 
SURVEILLANCE—INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX:  HOW THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS 
CONSCRIPTING BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SURVEILLANCE 
SOCIETY (2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/surveillance_report.pdf 
(discussing how current privacy laws and information-age technology are implicating pri-
vacy rights and leave citizens with very little control over their own information). 
 94 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 18 & 50 U.S.C.). 
 95 Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.?, supra note 30. 
 96 See e.g., id.; Ashby Jones, An OC Offer:  Give Us Your DNA and We’ll Drop Your Charges, WALL 
ST. J. L. BLOG (Sept. 24, 2009, 11:03 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/09/24/an-
offer-in-oc-give-us-your-dna-and-well-drop-your-charges/ [hereinafter Jones, O.C. Offer] 
(stating how Orange County has been “quietly” offering such a deal “to those arrested for 
misdemeanors”); California Report, Dansky interview, supra note 31. 
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[local] Orange County . . . database,” which is operated and main-
tained independently from any state or federal CODIS DNA databas-
es.97  The DNA profiles from the Orange County program are not 
processed by an accredited crime lab.98  The lack of accreditation 
could lead defendants to challenge the validity of evidence or leads 
obtained against them on the basis of quality.  DNA is not failsafe; it is 
subject to human error just like any other form of forensic evidence.99 
This program became public knowledge in 2009 when the District 
Attorney, in response to a budget crisis, successfully petitioned the 
Orange County Board of Supervisors to impose a $75 administrative 
fee on those who accepted the plea bargain.100  Although the Board of 
Supervisors’ passage of this administrative fee could be considered an 
implicit local legislative approval of the program, there is currently 
no state statute authorizing this program.101 
The program’s appeal to prosecutors is self-evident:  a greater 
number of cases may be processed using vastly fewer resources than 
traditional law enforcement methods.102  Since charges are dropped, 
the program also reduces the number of people imprisoned for non-
violent misdemeanor offenses.  California’s well-known struggles with 
prison overcrowding and budgetary woes make this especially attrac-
tive.103  Other supporters believe the program will lead to decreased 
 
 97 ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY REP., DNA:  WHOSE IS IT, ORANGE COUNTY CRIME LAB’S OR 
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S?, 3–4 (2010), available at http://www.ocgrandjury.org/
pdfs/DNA/DNA-Report.pdf; see also Tami Abdollah, D.A.’s DNA Database Growing in O.C., 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2009, at A3 [hereinafter Abdollah, O.C. DNA Database]; Abdollah, Ar-
rested in O.C.?, supra note 30. 
 98 Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.?, supra note 30 (stating that the Orange County database is 
“unusual” for not being run by an accredited crime lab). 
 99 California Report, Dansky interview, supra note 31. 
100 Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.?, supra note 30.  Although the misdemeanor program was not 
widely known to the public until 2009, the Orange County Board of Supervisors provided 
funding for the creation of this database in 2007.  ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY REP., su-
pra note 97, at 3 (noting that the Orange County Board of Supervisors provided $875,000 
worth of financial support to the DNA collection program). 
101 E-mail from Erwin Chemerinsky, Professor of Constitutional Law, U.C. Irvine School of 
Law, to author (Jan. 18, 2010, 20:01 EST) (on file with author) (stating that there is no 
statutory basis or authority that renders the DNA collection program legal). 
102 Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.?, supra note 30 (quoting Orange County District Attorney, Tony 
Rackauckas, who said the DNA collection program is advantageous “because we’re able to 
handle more cases with fewer resources”). 
103 See Randal C. Archibald, Driven to a Fiscal Brink, a State Throws Open the Doors to Its Prisons, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A14 (reporting that California’s prison population has long 
exceeded capacity); Ashby Jones, Ruling on Prison Overcrowding:  Cut 57,000 Prisoners, 
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 10, 2009, 9:49 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
2009/02/10/ruling-on-california-prison-overcrowding-cut-57000-prisoners/ (discussing a 
ruling by a three judge panel requiring California to “reduce its prison population by as 
many as 57,000"). 
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crime, based on the theory that if a person knows police have his 
DNA record on file, that person will be less likely to commit crimes in 
the future.104  Even if recidivism is not reduced, police have an addi-
tional law enforcement tool to catch the perpetrators.105  This pro-
gram led to a quadrupling of Orange County’s DNA database in 2009 
alone.106  Lastly, the program allows arrestees to avoid having criminal 
records, which can otherwise make them ineligible for certain jobs, 
child custody agreements, aid programs, and other government ben-
efits.107 
This program also has its critics.  In addition to criticisms about 
privacy, there is concern about the demoralizing effect on the police 
officers who make arrests only to see them disappear, particularly in 
narcotics arrests which often involve lengthy background work.108  
Others are concerned by the absence of empirical evidence establish-
ing the deterrent effect of DNA possession by law enforcement.109  In 
rogue, non-legislative enacted programs such as this Orange County 
program, the absence of the legislative process often means an ab-
sence of accountability and oversight and the inherent safeguards as-
sociated with the legislative process, such as public debate and deli-
beration.  Unlike programs enacted by the legislature, the only 
oversight comes from the rules decided upon by the attorney general, 
district attorney, or other founding executive branch actor.  If prose-
cutors had evidence sufficient for conviction, the program may ad-
versely affect community morale by advancing the perception that 
those who commit misdemeanors will escape punishment.110 
There is also a serious concern that this program seeks to punish 
those who have done nothing wrong.  Given the ease of providing a 
DNA sample in exchange for dropping charges, some lawyers have 
stated that it would be irresponsible not to advise a client to eliminate 
 
104 See Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.?, supra note 30 (“The DNA sample could act as a deterrent 
for potential criminals . . . .”). 
105 See Jones, O.C. Offer, supra note 96 (describing the DNA collection program as a “useful 
investigative tool for law enforcement”).  The Orange County District Attorney’s office 
has stated that “8% of previously convicted criminals commit 80% of all crimes.”  ORANGE 
COUNTY GRAND JURY REP., supra note 97, at 3. 
106 California Report, Dansky interview, supra note 31.  “By March 2010, over 25,000 buccal 
swabs had been collected and analyzed, and over 22,000 samples uploaded into the Dis-
trict Attorney’s DNA database, resulting in three hits (identification of the suspect).”  
ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY REP., supra note 97, at 3. 
107 California Report, Dansky interview, supra note 31. 
108 See Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.?, supra note 30 (“[L]aw enforcement will be demoralized, 
especially on narcotics cases . . . .”). 
109 Id. 
110 California Report, Dansky interview, supra note 31. 
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the uncertainties and expenses of defending against misdemeanor 
charges, even if that client knew he could prove he was innocent.111  
The appeal of this plea bargain calls into question the “voluntary” na-
ture of the exchange.  If a prosecutor has insufficient evidence to se-
cure a conviction, the ethical action is to drop the charges, not to col-
lect the defendant’s DNA.112 
Since the Orange County database is a local database, it sets its 
own rules and procedures.  County ordinances include a general pro-
vision against disclosing any confidential data the database holds, ex-
cept to authorized entities.113  The Orange County municipal code al-
so provides for sanctions against those who disclose confidential 
information illegally.114  Orange County permits investigators to re-
lease confidential information to the public when investigators deem 
it necessary to aid an ongoing investigation.  Further, disclosure is 
permitted in court documents and transcripts, which are usually pub-
lic documents.115  Orange County allows disclosure of data that has 
been anonymized for research or statistical analysis of populations.116 
There is no statutory authorization for mandatory collection of 
DNA from misdemeanor arrestees in California.  Therefore, in order 
to be legal, this program must be considered a purely voluntary ex-
change.  Plea bargains are considered contracts between the defen-
dant and the prosecutor.117  If these exchange contracts are entered 
into voluntarily, courts would likely conclude this program is the 
equivalent of a plea bargain.  “The plea bargaining process necessari-
ly exerts pressure on defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a se-
ries of fundamental rights, but [the Supreme Court has] repeatedly 
held that the government ‘may encourage a guilty plea by offering 
 
111 Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.?, supra note 30. 
112 California Report, Dansky interview, supra note 31. 
113 ORANGE COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 3, div. 17, art. 1, § 3–17–2 (2010). 
114 Id. at § 3-17-3.  Additionally, any actor who contributed to the unauthorized disclosure of 
DNA information could face liability under California’s public-disclosure-of-private-facts 
tort.  See Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1207 (Cal. 2007) (listing the elements of the tort 
as:  “(1) public disclosure (2) of a private fact (3) which would be offensive and objec-
tionable to the reasonable person, and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern.” (ci-
tation omitted)). 
115 See ORANGE COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES title 3, div. 17, art. 1, § 3-7-4(c) (2010) 
(“It is not a violation . . . to include Database Information in a transcript or record of a 
judicial proceeding, or in any other public record when the inclusion of the information 
in the public record is authorized by a court, statute, or decisional law.”). 
116 See id. at § 3-7-4(d) (authorizing the use of anonymous DNA records “for training, re-
search, [and] statistical analysis of populations”).  
117 Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1430 (2009). 
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substantial benefits in return for the plea.’”118  Plea bargains, there-
fore, do not have to result in a fair or balanced exchange of benefits.  
Parties may take advantage of the differences in bargaining power to 
achieve the best possible benefits.  As long as both parties agree to 
the terms, a plea bargain will be upheld.  “[A]lthough some waiver 
agreements may not be the product of an informed and voluntary 
decision, this possibility does not justify invalidating all such agree-
ments.”119  The Orange County program could be considered the 
equivalent of a plea bargain. 
Excluding a strictly legal definition of “voluntary” and applying a 
more common sense definition of the word “voluntary” calls into 
question this program’s “voluntariness.”  Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
voluntary as:  (1) voluntary act, one done by design or intention; (2) 
voluntary statement, one unconstrained by interference; not impelled 
by outside influence; (3) voluntary gift, one without valuable consid-
eration or legal obligation; gratuitous; (4) voluntary deed, one having 
merely nominal consideration.120  Especially when considering the 
second and third definitions, the voluntary nature of this program is 
questionable.  The outside influence here is the threat of prosecution 
for a crime, and the valuable consideration exchanged is having all 
charges against the defendant dropped.  Particularly for defendants 
who have no prior criminal record or defendants for whom another 
conviction would implicate some sort of increased sentence, the op-
portunity to avoid criminal charges is a significant inducement. 
VI.  PRIVACY EVALUATION OF THE ORANGE COUNTY PROGRAM 
The Orange County program implicates many of the concerns 
about arrestee DNA sampling.  Since California grants its citizens the 
constitutional right to privacy,121 borderline cases should be resolved 
in favor of giving extra protections to the privacy of citizens.  In 2007, 
66,665 people were arrested on misdemeanor charges in Orange 
County.122  Of those arrested, 55,102 (82.7%) were eventually 
 
118 United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209–10 (1995) (quoting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 
439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978)). 
119 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
120 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1710–11 (9th ed. 2009). 
121 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1972) (granting “[a]ll people” inalienable rights, including the 
right to privacy). 
122 Total Misdemeanor Arrests by Gender, Offense, and Arrest Rate, Orange County, in CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFILE, tbl.4A (2007), available at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/
cjsc_stats/prof07/30/4A.htm. 
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charged.123  For misdemeanor arrests, prosecutors can offer this bar-
gain, reducing the burden on limited government resources, and 
achieving alternate goals where there may be less than compelling 
evidence for a conviction.  Given the challenges an innocent person 
faces when defending against criminal accusations, the relative ease 
of dropping misdemeanor charges in exchange for a DNA sample re-
sults in a database containing the DNA of presumptively innocent 
people.124  The Orange County database unfairly burdens that inno-
cent person’s constitutional right to privacy.  An innocent person 
should not have to speculate whether the government is using his 
DNA sample to facilitate investigations or prosecutions. 
As discussed, this program may be considered “voluntary” under 
some interpretations of the word, but not under others.  These con-
travening theories of voluntariness underscore society’s expectation 
that legislatures set the boundaries of criminal law and practice 
through public debate and deliberations.  The privacy concerns 
raised by this program deserve thorough consideration by the legisla-
ture or by the citizens through a ballot initiative.  If a court found the 
Orange County system involuntary, then not only would it violate 
state law and the first article of the California Constitution, the pro-
gram could also violate the Fourth Amendment guarantee to the 
right to be free from searches and seizures absent probable cause.  
Since this program was created by the Orange County District Attor-
ney without input from the legislature, absent the legislature’s im-
primatur, the voluntariness of this program remains an open ques-
tion. 
No other known local or state jurisdiction has shown a willingness 
to follow Orange County’s lead in offering DNA plea bargains to 
misdemeanor offenders.  This is likely an implicit recognition that 
the challenges facing such a program have not yet been resolved and 
therefore exposes jurisdictions to unknown but real potential liabili-
ties.  The ACLU has already filed a challenge to the Orange County 
program in the California courts. 
 
123 Id. 
124 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453–54 (1895) (solidifying the concept of innocent 
until proven guilty that would become pervasive in American jurisprudence). 
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A.  The Indefinite Duration of Time Is Inappropriate Given the Large Number 
of Presumptively Innocent People Whose Profiles Are Stored in This 
Database 
One area of concern is the length of time the Orange County da-
tabase keeps DNA samples.  In the federal NDIS database, DNA pro-
files are kept indefinitely.125  Those DNA profiles, however, are more 
limited in scope than the DNA profiles in the Orange County data-
base and are held to more rigorous quality control standards.  Based 
on the Privacy Act of 1974, federal law enforcement is not allowed to 
maintain dossiers of information on individuals who are not sus-
pected of wrongdoing.126 
In addition to its constitutional guarantee to privacy, California 
enacted a similar law to the federal Privacy Act, the Information Prac-
tices Act, in 1977.127  Unlike the federal NDIS database, given the pre-
viously discussed asymmetric dynamics involved in offering this plea 
bargain to arrestees, it is likely that the Orange County database in-
cludes many profiles of people who never did anything wrong.  By in-
cluding the DNA of individuals who were arrested but never charged, 
arguably officials in Orange County are violating both California’s 
own constitutional guarantee to privacy and the Information Practic-
es Act, which is analogous to the federal Privacy Act. 
Unlike California, other states, such as New York, have procedures 
in place so that a person can petition a court to expunge his DNA 
profile from the database if no criminal charges are filed.128  Orange 
County, however, has no such procedures for removing DNA profiles 
from the database. 
Arguably, Orange County’s admitted desire to expand its database 
by including profiles of people it does not intend to charge with 
crimes conflicts with enacting procedures to remove DNA profiles.  
For example, if arrestees knew as soon as the charges were dropped 
they could have their DNA profiles removed from the Orange County 
 
125 See Biology Unit—CODIS Program, MESAAZ.GOV, http://www.mesaaz.gov/police/
ForensicServices/Biology_Unit_CODIS_Program.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (official 
website of the City of Mesa, Arizona). 
126 See supra note 76. 
127 Information Practices Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.24 (West 2009) (prohibiting the disclo-
sure of personal information “in a manner that would link the information disclosed to 
the individual to whom it pertains” unless it meets a certain exception). 
128 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c (McKinney 1996); Seth Axelrad, Survey of State DNA Database Sta-
tutes, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF LAW, MEDICINE, AND ETHICS, http://aslme.org/
dna_04/grid/guide.pdf. (discussing how under New York state law, individuals may “peti-
tion for expungement of  his DNA sample and records when no criminal action is taken 
against him.”). 
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database, the prosecutors would have little incentive to offer the plea 
bargain in good faith.  Ideally, then, to balance privacy and law en-
forcement interests, a time limitation on the inclusion of arrestee 
profiles in the database should be imposed.  Orange County could 
still maintain the arrestee records for some period of time, but by 
eventually removing DNA samples, the citizen’s reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy based on the Fourth Amendment and the California 
Constitution is eventually restored.129 
B.  The Stated Prohibition Against Familial Searching Is a Necessary Privacy 
Protection but Should Be Made Official Through Legislative Action 
In response to privacy advocates, the Orange County District At-
torney’s office declared they will not use their database to do familial 
searches.130  As previously discussed, familial searching is one of the 
most hotly-contested privacy frontiers in the evolution of the use of 
DNA evidence.131  The District Attorney’s declaration concedes to 
those interested parties who feared an unregulated local database 
had great leeway to erode privacy protections.  By forgoing familial 
searches, Orange County is protecting citizens who have no criminal 
history and have a fully intact reasonable expectation of privacy.132 
C.  The Allowed and Encouraged Degree of Function Creep in This Database 
Poses the Greatest Risk to Privacy and Should Be Curtailed 
The Orange County database can legally be mined for research or 
statistical purposes;133 therefore, the program carries an extra risk of 
function creep.  Permitting research and statistical analysis potentially 
allows the database to be combined with other public and private da-
tabases, including credit histories, medical or educational records, 
and other social databases.  Currently, the Orange County DNA data-
base is only known to be combined with criminal records databases.  
California’s Information Practices Act, however, explicitly allows 
agencies to share confidential data with the University of California 
or other programs approved by the Committee for the Protection of 
 
129 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2000) (“To withdraw protection of [a] minimum 
[and reasonable] expectation [of privacy] would be to permit police technology to erode 
the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”). 
130 Abdollah, O.C. DNA Database, supra note 97. 
131 See, e.g., Hogan, supra note 62, at 545. 
132 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (noting that the Fourth Amendment requires that the police respect 
minimal, reasonable expectations of privacy). 
133 ORANGE COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 3, div. 17, art. 1, § 3-17-4(d) (2010). 
May 2011] PLEA BARGAINING FOR DNA 1137 
 
Human Subjects based on certain criteria.134  In other words, al-
though the legislature never approved the Orange County program, 
the legislature expressly contemplated that this DNA database will be 
subject to function creep.  If the University of California or other 
programs publicly release the results of their studies, they could be 
used by health insurers, employers, or other private companies to 
learn more about the private characteristics of the California “crimi-
nal” population.135 
Even if the data would be released anonymously and in the aggre-
gate does not necessarily protect the privacy of individuals.  From 
2006 through 2009, Netflix sponsored a contest to improve movie 
recommendations for its customers and released a putatively ano-
nymous, aggregated dataset of thousands of its customers’ rental his-
tories.136  Researchers from the University of Texas, however, deci-
phered rental patterns and actually identified individual customers 
within this allegedly “anonymous” data.137  The resulting uproar led 
Netflix to cancel plans for a second contest after private parties and 
the Federal Trade Commission filed legal challenges.138  It is easily 
conceivable that similar breaches of privacy could occur with a DNA 
database, particularly the Orange County database that is shared for 
research and statistical purposes.  Arguably, disclosing a person’s 
medical information or DNA profile is far more serious than disclos-
ing a person’s movie rental history and could expose Orange County 
to legal action.  Over time, as data mining technology improves, the 
risk of inadvertent or deliberate disclosure of individuals from an al-
legedly anonymous aggregated database will increase.  Combined 
with the fact that a majority of this database will consist of profiles of 
misdemeanor arrestees, the database raises a profound risk of being 
used for inappropriate data mining of a large sample of the Califor-
 
134 Information Practices Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.24(t)(1) (West 2009). 
135 Gabel, supra note 3, at 30–31 (noting that for now, privacy laws dictate that “neither in-
surers nor employers can require a prospective insured or employee to submit to DNA 
testing as a prerequisite to being insured or employed[, but] such laws include exceptions 
for law enforcement purposes, along with provisions for paternity testing and fetal and 
newborn screening”).  These prohibitions would not, however, prevent those institutions 
from drawing statistical conclusions about this population from the results of publicly 
available studies. 
136 Steve Lohr, Netflix Cancels Contest After Concerns Are Raised About Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
12, 2010, at B3. 
137 Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anomization of Large Datasets (How to 
Break Anonymity of the Netflix Prize Dataset) 11–12 (February 5, 2008) (unpublished ar-
ticle available online), available at http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/cs/pdf/0610/
0610105v2.pdf. 
138 Lohr, supra note 136. 
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nia population.  This goes far beyond the originally contemplated 
purposes of tracking convicted criminals or other law enforcement 
purposes.139 
Function creep is also a serious concern from the perspective of 
police access.  Although local police are not allowed to maintain their 
own databases with credit history, travel records, and other personal 
information, they are allowed to purchase this information from data 
aggregating companies.140  They could then use this information to 
identify suspects’ behavioral patterns or otherwise aid their investiga-
tions.  Since the data collected by private companies is not subject to 
the Privacy Act or the Freedom of Information Act, there is no feder-
ally mandated standard regarding the preparation and collection of 
this data.141  Given that there are no statutes addressing Orange 
County’s program, and therefore no statutory limitations on what 
type of data can be aggregated with the County’s DNA collection, 
function creep remains one of the greatest privacy concerns asso-
ciated with this program. 
VII.  CONCLUSION:  EVALUATION OF THE ORANGE COUNTY PROGRAM 
Orange County’s program to offer plea bargains for DNA in ex-
change for dropped charges is provocative and may be an important 
tool in helping law enforcement to solve crimes.  Although the priva-
cy implications of this policy are unclear and there are many issues 
the legislative and judicial branches have not decisively answered, 
there are some outstanding concerns. 
Orange County should establish formal procedures permitting 
individuals to remove their DNA from the database if certain condi-
tions are met.  The legislature should also amend the statutes to for-
malize and permanently enact the District Attorney’s prohibition on 
familial searching.  Finally, Orange County should enact or revise sta-
tutes and policies to prohibit disclosure of the DNA database for re-
search and statistical purposes to preclude function creep and limit 
database use to police investigations only.  Orange County should al-
so prohibit police from obtaining commercially available information 
to combine with its DNA database.  As the project evolves it is vitally 
 
139 O.C. DNA Database, supra note 97, at A3 (listing the purpose of the database as “to identify 
criminal suspects”). 
140 STANLEY, supra note 93, at 26 (noting that “local police departments subscribe to private 
sector information services” in order to obtain information about a person). 
141 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (1974); Freedom of Information Act of 1986, 5 
U.S.C. § 552 (amended 2007). 
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important to closely safeguard the privacy of the people whose in-
formation is stored in the database from the demands of instant and 
complete access to information that the modern world expects. 
